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Abstract 
Considering recent theoretical accounts on the trajectory of French unionism under 
localised bargaining, this article examines potential consequences for the country’s 
traditionally largest radical union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). 
Deploying a case study of CGT at PSA Peugeot Citroёn and Renault in the years since 
the 2008 automotive crisis, the article observes a persistent pattern of militant 
opposition within company and plant union sections. Company bargaining structure, 
inter-union reformist collaboration and electoral considerations are identified as 
workplace mechanisms reinforcing CGT actions at this level. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing substitution of sectoral agreements for those struck at company and 
plant is an established European trend. In France, collective bargaining has 
historically been conducted at sector level with central agreements concluded 
between employer associations and unions. Decentralisation of bargaining to 
the company started from the early 1980s, although the principle of favourability 
forbade company agreements from providing less favourable terms than those 
agreed at sector. This principle has been significantly diluted in recent reforms 
which provide greater autonomy and flexibility in the conclusion of company 
level agreements (Marginson, 2015). Such trends have been accompanied by 
reforms in union representativeness whereby electoral audiences at workplace 
determine bargaining capacity, rather than presumptions of national 
representativeness. Recent literature on French industrial relations hints at diverging 
trajectories for trade unionism in this context of decentralisation. In one strand, greater 
decentralisation is said to reinforce pre-existing weaknesses in the unions (Howell, 
2009). Exposed to firms’ competitive pressures, workplace unions risk succumbing to 
a subordinated compliance in ensuring plant viability. However, an alternative 
interpretation implies that such risks are overstated. Drawing on a macro-cultural 
account of French industrial relations, it proposes a ‘permissive ideational 
environment’ that continues to legitimise and sustain radical action even amid crisis 
(Parsons, 2013a; see also Milner, 2002; Milner and Mathers, 2013; Mathers, 2017). 
 
Given diverging theoretical pathways, the article examines the trajectory of France’s 
traditionally largest radical union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) at 
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company and plant level where competitiveness bargaining occurs to preserve plant 
viability. While scholarship has been conscious of a CGT shift from militancy at the 
confederal centre (Giraud, 2015), literature suggests that the confederation’s 
response to bargaining at devolved levels is not well understood. It is difficult to infer 
workplace behaviour from national confederal trends given traditions of union 
autonomy at sector and company (Thomas, 2016). To contribute to knowledge and 
understanding, the article focuses on CGT company and plant sections syndicales 
(trade union sections), considering how firm competitive pressures impact radical 
unions’ workplace bargaining, and whether responses pull in the direction of greater 
cooperation or if more paradigmatic militant stances prevail. Specifically, the article 
uses a case study examining CGT in the French automotive industry at PSA Peugeot-
Citroёn (PSA) and Renault across 12 plants over several years after the automotive 
crisis of 2008. The article shows CGT adopting a pattern of militant opposition towards 
employers despite sustained job loss and threats to plant viability. We propose several 
institutional influences encouraging such outcomes. In what follows, the article 
develops the study’s rationale, the research design and findings. The discussion of the 
case and its potential for more generalised application concludes the piece. 
 
2. Context: Workplace bargaining and radical unionism in France 
The progressive shift from sectoral to company level bargaining in France has been 
shaped by concerns over employer competitiveness, an issue with added significance 
in a country where deindustrialisation is pronounced. French manufacturing has seen 
its share in value-added terms drop to one of the lowest in the Eurozone behind Italy 
and Spain (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, 2014). Since 2007, 
an estimated 345,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost, with foreign competition 
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identified as a primary cause (ibid.). Competition in the global market has eroded the 
competitiveness of French businesses, both in exports and domestically.  
 
In this context, the state has sought to encourage greater workplace bargaining to aid 
employer flexibility and bolster competitiveness. Where the ‘favourability principle’ 
once forbade company agreements from providing inferior terms to those agreed at 
sector, ‘derogations’ now weaken this practice. The Fillon Law (2004), Social 
Democracy and Working Time (2008), Employment Securitisation (2013) and the 
Macron Law (2015) expand the range of derogations available. For example, company 
pacts can now provide for less favourable pay that sectoral rates in exchange for job 
security where employers face economic difficulties and work hours can now be fixed 
independently of industry agreements. In supporting company level bargaining, the 
structure of union representation has been reorganised. Since 2008, delegates 
appointed for negotiations have been selected according to quadrennial elections 
rather than affiliation to one of the confederations that had been presumed to be 
nationally representative (Laulom, 2012). Elections to plant comités d'entreprise (CE)1 
are now the test of representativeness for negotiation rights, with unions needing 10% 
support to be representative and 30% to sign agreements, although the latter has been 
revised under the 2016 El-Khomri Law to 50%. The 2008 reforms empowered unions 
commanding 50% to oppose negotiated agreements, since modified under El-Khomri 
so that unions with 30% may only refer objections to an employee referendum. 
Support from workplace electoral audiences thus determines union capacity to partake 
in and influence bargaining. 
                                                            
1 Enterprise committees, statutory information and consultation bodies, operate at workplace level. Their 
equivalent at company level are termed Comités Centraux de l'Entreprise (CCE). 
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In this context of decentralisation, whither French unionism? Traditions of sectoral 
bargaining have produced a legacy inhospitable to workplace unionism, exemplified 
by France’s low union density. Consequently, some theorise that decentralisation 
aggravates pre-existing union weaknesses in the workplace, leading to isolated worker 
collectivities (Pernot, 2010). While the growing incidence of non-union bodies is one 
conduit for this, “severely weakened unions” (Howell, 2009: 236) is another. This 
reflects notions that firm-specific competitive pressures encourage workplace unions 
to develop a ‘plant egoism’, acting in ways that depart from confederal lines (Streeck, 
1984). As Rogers and Streeck (1995: 12) theorise, concessionary pressures on plant 
unionism raise implications for radical confederations particularly: 
For militant unions engaged in political class struggle, the enterprise is a sphere 
of potential wildcat cooperation with the employer: workers acting on their 
narrow interest in the health and profitability of “their” firm and disregarding the 
interests of the working class as a whole. Industrial unions’ typical fear of 
workplace-based particularism opened the possibility, and often indeed 
produced the reality, of an unlikely compromise. 
 
A domestication of radical unionism is implied with union sections succumbing to a 
“bias towards cooperation…centred around the needs of the firm” (Howell, 1992: 261), 
becoming “functionally indistinguishable from enterprise unions” (Howell, 2009: 236; 
c.f. Goyer and Hancké, 2004). A ‘micro-corporatist’ enterprise consciousness thus 
prevails, whereby unions internalise employers’ competitiveness agenda (Levesque 
and Murray, 2005: 506). This is likely to be pronounced under crisis conditions where 
plant viability and jobs are at stake.  
 
Yet, counselling against union incorporation is a theoretical assessment highlighting 
radical unions’ inelasticity to change (Parson, 2013a). Drawing on macro-cultural 
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traditions of the French system, this analysis emphasises a “permissive ideational 
environment” (ibid. 303) for radical action even in conditions of economic crisis. The 
combined legacies of employer unilateralism, union syndicalism and a dirigiste state 
willing to moderate the market and shore up the confederations, encourage a mix of 
militancy and protest for workplace culture (c.f. Milner, 2002). Allied to widespread 
cynicism in France about globalisation’s merits, an environment exists in which militant 
contestation retains a high degree of legitimacy (see also Mathers, 2017). Coercive 
market forces do not simply disembowel ideological orientations of radical unions, as 
traditions persist and mediate crisis pressures. Under this scenario, localised 
bargaining will continue to see evidence of union contestation. 
 
Divergent trajectories within the above literature raise implications for radical 
confederations, who remain an established feature of France’s institutional framework. 
Notable here is CGT with a reported 710,000 members. Historically CGT strategy has 
prioritised political mobilisation at national level (Upchurch et al. 2009). Denouncing 
and refusing to sign agreements have been its hallmark, condemning rival unions that 
do sign as engaging in class compromise. Yet contemporary accounts emphasise a 
shift from a “union of refusal” to a “unionism of proposals and negotiations”, although 
the nature and extent of this transformation is unclear (Andolfatto, 2007). Accounts 
emphasise declining membership and reduced Parti Communiste Français (PCF) 
influence over the confederation as encouraging reform (Connolly, 2014). More 
recently, the union has been overtaken by Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) as France’s most representative union 
nationally (Ministère du Travail, 2017), inducing a further bout of internal 
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reassessment within CGT2. Faced with new challenges, a partial move to the centre-
left and closer relations with Parti Socialiste (PS) have been encouraged including 
electoral support for François Hollande (Parsons, 2015). There are also accounts of 
greater CGT willingness to sign agreements (Labbé and Nezosi, 2007; Milner and 
Mathers, 2013) although this may depend on whether these are distributive or 
integrative in character and the level at which they occur (national, sectoral or 
workplace). For some scholars, CGT retains a reputation as a “systematically 
belligerent ex-communist” union (Clegg and van Wujnbergen, 2011) relative to the 
reformist bloc comprising France’s fractious confederal scene3. Negotiated reform is 
characterised as difficult given “CGT concerns not to cede that which has been gained 
through struggle” (Parsons, 2013b: 202). Yet many accounts’ focus on national 
developments may not reflect nuances within a union known for “organised anarchy” 
and workplace autonomy (Thomas, 2016: 33). Milner (2012) refers to internal tensions 
over a perceived reformist drift at national level with grassroots unease about any 
collaboration with CFDT. As recently as 2013, CGT conferences report grassroots 
resolve to “return to the ‘class struggle’, with protests to emphasise their discontent” 
(Tissandier, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 See ‘La CFDT devance la CGT et devient le premier syndicat de France au niveau national’, Le Monde 31st 
March, 2017 
3 Other radical confederations include the smaller Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques (SUD)(a leftist split from 
CFDT);  broadly  reformist  confederations  include  CFDT  (social  democratic  with  leftist/rightist  factions), 
Confédération Française de l'Encadrement‐Confédération Générale des Cadres (CFE‐CGC) (a managerial union), 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens CFTC (Christian democratic), Force Ouvrière  (FO)(originally 
anti‐communist, economistic in focus) and Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (UNSA)(a confederation 
of autonomous unions, primarily public sector based). 
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3. Analytical Framework: Trade union strategy under workplace bargaining 
Given the uncertainty over how exposure to company level competitive pressures 
might affect radical unions’ workplace bargaining, further consideration is merited. 
Existing accounts of union strategy can be deployed to frame such analysis. 
Examining how unions survive where “their world is one of decentralised 
bargaining with and within firms”, Boxall and Haynes (1997:  568) theorise that 
unions face several strategic choices in ensuring continued effectiveness as 
organisations. Unions exercise choice insofar as deciding to do one thing 
implies deciding not to do the other, with choices being strategic insofar as they 
influence organisational viability. For example, Blyton et al. (2001) demonstrate 
that in responding to restructuring threats in the aviation industry, unions chose 
different strategies of conflict and cooperation to protect workers’ interests. 
Some unions pursued adversarial industrial action as an effective response to 
airline restructuring, while others secured partnerships which shifted 
restructuring towards quality enhancement and the offering of concessions in 
exchange for greater influence over management decisions. Effective choices 
for Boxall and Haynes (1997) require that unions select actions meeting not only 
the needs of their support base, but which also compel employers to shift their 
behaviour. Choices are ineffectual, not only where employer positions remain 
unmoved by union action, but also where unions misjudge the mood of workers 
and become detached from their support. A risk of ‘strategic drift’ ensues 
(Boxall, 2008: 210), with unions becoming disconnected from the challenges 
presented by their environments, potentially eroding their organisational 
viability.  
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In specifying the kind of strategic choices unions might make in response to 
competitive pressures at firm level, Bacon and Blyton (2004) offer guidance. They 
conceptualise union choices as combining ideological ‘orientation’ of militancy and 
moderation with ‘actions’ of conflict and cooperation. Combined, this creates what 
might be termed four strategic choices: militant-conflict (termed ‘militant 
opposition’), militant-cooperation (termed ‘militant engagement’), moderate-
conflict (termed ‘moderate opposition’) and moderate-cooperation (termed 
‘cooperative engagement’) (p. 752-754). Militant opposition is a refusal to cooperate 
with restructuring and protective of the status quo (p. 753). Concluding an agreement 
in this scenario is unlikely unless the union imposes a ‘win’ or is coerced into unwilling 
submission through lockout or strike defeat. In light of the previous discussion, such a 
pattern would align with traditional CGT postures. However, militants may calculate 
that opposition is self-defeating where employment loss occurs, or is likely. They may 
therefore move to problem-solving bargaining to preserve jobs, that is, militant 
engagement. Here militants bargain with management, cooperating on specific issues 
and trade-offs where interests coincide (p. 754). However, bargaining relations remain 
adversarial in this scenario. Next, moderate opposition aligns to classic ‘bread and 
butter’ unionism. Here the unions seek to bargain in good faith, but will intermittently 
adopt uncooperative positions in the bargaining process, where the employer seek 
“too much ‘give’ from unions” (p. 753). Unlike militants, moderate unionists will prefer 
to avoid strike action and cut a ‘sellable deal’ at the negotiating table. In cooperative 
engagement, moderate unionists embrace a partnership approach, management are 
seen to ‘play fair’ and integrative bargaining is expected as routine (p. 753). Strikes 
are eschewed as risking plant viability and employer goodwill. 
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These different patterns can be used to map an assessment of how radical 
unions choose to respond to cases of workplace bargaining where employers 
seek greater competitiveness in exchange for plant viability. Following from the 
diverging theoretical concerns outlined above and using CGT as a radical 
exemplar, do localised responses align with their ‘paradigmatic’ choice of 
militant opposition or are alternative choices being made? What explains such 
choices and what implications can be drawn for understanding the choices 
radical unions face under decentralised bargaining in France generally? 
 
3. Research Design 
To address the above, a case study is presented drawing on eight years of evidence 
from company and plant level analysis of CGT sections in PSA and Renault. The case 
commends itself for several reasons. CGT is the largest union, on representative 
criteria, in the metalworking industry, forming CGT-Fédération des Travailleurs de la 
Métallurgie (CGT-FTM) 4. It has traditionally commanded the largest support in PSA 
CCE (until 2015) and Renault CCE (until 2011). The auto sector, and PSA and Renault 
particularly, are also appropriate as the industry has been subject to significant job 
losses in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis with employers seeking greater 
competitiveness to secure plant viability.  
 
Indeed, the industry is at the centre of a national debate around relocation as a cost-
cutting business strategy. Automotive manufacturing fell by 40% between 2005 and 
2011. In total, 1.7 million vehicles (of the 3.6 million PSA and Renault produced) were 
manufactured in France in 2011 against 2.8 million in 2005. The auto sector employed 
                                                            
4 CGT‐FTM membership is reported as 65,000 
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321,000 people in 2000, dropping to 220,000 in 2010, while automotive manufacturers 
now employ 137,000 workers (2016), compared with 187,000 ten years previous. PSA 
and Renault have accumulated 30,000 combined job losses across France since 
2008. Despite status as ‘national champions’, commanding 65% of direct employment 
in the sector, only 40% of PSA’s workforce and 38% of Renault’s are employed 
nationally. Since the 1990s, both companies have shifted resources from France, 
favouring new plants abroad. Complementing this trend is the outsourcing of ‘non-
core’ production to suppliers, producing a smaller workforce where production workers 
have declined relative to professional/technical staff in both firms. In France, 49% of 
all PSA employees are production workers, compared with only 30% in Renault. In 
both firms, support for CFE-CGC has grown. 
 
For this article, CGT sections’ orientation and action are evidenced in the context of 
the background, negotiation and transposition of competitiveness agreements at PSA 
and Renault. The period of study is 2008-2015, with emphasis on the 2012-2013 
period of negotiated competitiveness agreements. Developments are studied at 
company level and at nine assembly and three powertrain sites, where redundancies 
were widespread and plant closure was regularly threatened (Table 1). Evidence was 
gathered via archival documentation, interviews and observational fieldwork (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
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Questions of reliability and validity were addressed during fieldwork. Reliability of 
evidence was corroborated by triangulating across different evidence sources and 
different unions on the same issues. Regarding validity of the evidence, Strauss’s 
(1987) coding process was followed. Identification of codes was based on patterns 
laid out in Section 2. 
 
4. Findings 
PSA Company Level 
The 2008 crisis prompted substantial employment restructuring at PSA. Initiated with 
3,500 redundancies, pay was frozen (2008-2010), followed by a below-inflation 
increase (2010-2011) and pay pauses (2012-2015). In 2012 PSA announced 8,000 
redundancies, with the Aulnay plant, employing 3,600 workers, identified for closure. 
Rennes and Sevelnord also risked shutdown with these plans emerging after a CGT 
press conference presented leaked executive memos to the media, revealing 
production transfer to either “Turkey, Morocco or Eastern Europe”. Announcement of 
Aulnay’s closure produced an alliance involving company and plant sections of CFE-
CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA to develop a social plan for redundancy and 
redeployment. CGT remained independent of the alliance, as did CFDT. Table 3 
identifies the representative unions at PSA in this period. 
 
Table 3 
 
Rejecting site closure in principle, CGT proposed saving Aulnay by more egalitarian 
inter-plant volume distributions, reducing executive remuneration and redirecting 
dividends and former executive pensions toward financing suspended hybrid projects. 
The closure announcement was followed by CGT Aulnay organising a four-month 
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strike involving 300 workers at the site. The strike evidenced flying pickets, reported 
violence and plant sabotage by CGT activists. CFDT Aulnay initially participated 
before CFDT centre ordered a return to work. In response, the reformist alliance 
organised a campaign ‘Come Together to Save PSA!’, claiming “Trotskyite infiltration” 
of CGT Aulnay and CGT intimidation of non-strikers. During the strike, the alliance 
further requested, and management obliged, to bring Aulnay’s closure forward from 
2014 to late 2013: 
The situation at Aulnay can no longer guarantee employees’ physical and 
psychological security.  Already heavily affected by the planned closure of their 
site, these employees should not have to suffer the misconduct, intimidation 
and harassment of a few troublemakers.  Given the circumstances and risks to 
staff, for the benefit of employees we request the immediate implementation of 
voluntary redeployment measures under the social plan. 
CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO, GSEA CCE Motion 
 
Given sufficient representativeness, a social plan was concluded in March 2013 
between PSA and the alliance, with CFDT PSA delegate support. CGT refused to sign, 
maintaining the strike for a further month before returning to work in exchange for 
enabling strikers, fired for alleged misconduct, to avail of redundancy and 
redeployment terms. 
 
Parallel to Aulnay, the future of the Sevelnord plant was under review. Output had 
declined by approximately 50% in the four years after 2008 and Fiat terminated its 
purchasing contract at the site in 2012. A transfer of models to Spain was proposed 
unless investment and labour concessions were secured. In the interim, a Toyota 
investment partnership for Sevelnord was obtained, albeit with PSA insisting it hinged 
on pay moderation and flexibility concessions in return. While CFE-CGC, FO and 
GSEA entered negotiations, CGT refused, calling for an independent assessment of 
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Sevelnord’s finances. CGT maintained that Toyota’s investment was not contingent 
on concessions and simply amounted to PSA opportunism. An independent 
assessment, potentially delaying negotiations by several months, required support 
from other unions as CGT lacked representative authority to secure a review alone. 
Support was not forthcoming, with FO retorting that CGT was “burying its head in the 
sand” (FO Sevelnord Communiqué). A plant agreement, signed by CFE-CGC, FO and 
GSEA, provided a two-year pay freeze, working time extensions when daily production 
targets were not met and reduced notice periods in disbanding, creating or transferring 
production teams. In exchange, PSA pledged a three-year no redundancy policy. 
Refusing to sign, CGT maintained:  
This agreement…could be applied to all of PSA, even the entire auto industry. 
We cannot accept such a dangerous agreement…They do not have the right 
to use the trauma of Aulnay to impose concessions at Sevelnord and say, ‘first 
you sign then you get the vehicle’. 
CGT PSA Delegate 
 
Regarded by senior management as a pattern setter for the sector5, the Sevelnord 
agreement became generalised across PSA via the 2013 Nouveau contrat social 
(NCS). NCS provided a pay freeze for 2013 to 2016, daily production guarantees, 
mandatory job mobility and overtime, a near 50% reduction in overtime pay and 
limiting the summer break to three rather than four weeks. Plants producing fewer than 
250,000 vehicles per year would also have one production line removed, with job 
losses as necessary. Prior to formal commencement of NCS negotiations, CGT 
proposed inter-confederal cooperation in company-wide strikes to protest PSA 
proposals. In the interim, CGT organised several one day strikes with subsequent 
CFDT participation (Table 4). 
                                                            
5 See ‘Peugeot urges broader pay deal after Sevelnord win’, Reuters, 2012. 
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Table 4 
 
Aside from CFDT participation, CGT calls for wider union involvement went 
unanswered, apart from CFTC, publically announcing it would not partake as “we do 
not want to relive the CGT experience at Aulnay and send employees to the job 
centre...after making them think it was possible to stop the site from closing by fighting” 
(CFTC PSA Communiqué). CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA combined to ratify NCS 
in exchange for PSA pledges to maintain production levels, avoid closures until 2016 
and launch new models in each plant. Their signatures were criticised by CGT and 
CFDT, the latter, it appears, under pressure from plant sections. CGT maintained that 
promises on volumes were too low, essentially “hot air to justify regressive attacks” 
(CGT Poissy Delegate). In response, reformists maintained for example: 
 
There are concessions to make. We don’t want to become a second Aulnay. 
Other unions burnt tyres and intimidated employees, but in the end, did Aulnay 
stay open? 
GSEA Tremery Section Leader 
 
 
 
PSA Plant Level 
Transposing NCS to plants required further consultation to tailor with each site’s 
circumstance around working time in particular. The context of union site 
representativeness in this period is detailed below. 
 
Table 5 
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Patterns of reformist alliance and CGT independence replicates at three plants. The 
alliances’ stated objectives were to develop “partnership unionism” (Sochaux 
Alliance), “pragmatic cooperation with management” (Mulhouse Alliance) and 
“preservation of the site and repatriation of production” (Rennes Alliance). Voting 
pacts, formed for CE elections, exhibited an anti-CGT stance, evident in circulated 
communiqués in the plants: 
Why make a communal electoral list? Because our ideas on how to defend 
employees’ interests are close: we think negotiation is always the best way.  It’s 
through working to draft and sign agreements that we find solutions...It is more 
effective than other scattered action which can play into management’s hands. 
Certain unions will propose other ways of doing this, but history shows us (take 
Aulnay, for example) that resorting to violence does not always have the effect 
that employees expect. 
Rennes Alliance Communiqué 
 
Indeed, the Rennes Alliance emerged in the context of an unexpected surge in CGT 
votes in 2010 as the plant, based in the Catholic Breton region, is traditionally 
reformist. The surge was regarded by the Alliance as a ‘protest vote’ against job loss. 
Some evidence indicates PSA preference for these reformist alliances, insofar as it 
weakens CGT influence on plants’ CEs. At Mulhouse for example, leaked 
management documents indicated a view that the alliance was “the best option” in the 
face of CGT’s “reactionary communism”. Yet alternative inter-union relations prevailed 
at plants where one dominant union commanded representative clout to independently 
determine outcomes: FO Poissy and GSEA Trémery. This limited the necessity for 
coalitions, although CGT attempted an alliance with SUD and CFDT to counter GSEA 
dominance at Trémery. This disbanded within a year over divisions on pay demands. 
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In opposition to NCS negotiations, these plants saw, independent of company one-
day strikes, shorter stoppages of varying duration (typically one to three hours) led by 
CGT or co-led by CGT and CFDT (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
 
Strikes continued during consultations, with smaller numbers of workers involved. 
Justifying such actions, a CGT delegate claimed: 
 
There is no real dialogue, a few delegates can’t change management’s mind in 
a meeting. It’s our collective force in the workshops that will make them stop 
being so arrogant and make them eat the NCS. As for thinking that a union can 
get production workers out of a sticky situation, we don’t think it can happen 
through negotiation. Employees should learn to defend themselves. They 
should have confidence in their own power, whether they are unionised or not 
unionised. Our power is in the number of workers we have, it’s not about having 
a few dozen delegates. In reality, we can’t negotiate anything with the boss, not 
without the exercise of power. 
CGT Sochaux Section Leader 
 
CGT coordinated stoppages to overlap NCS plant consultations. As a CGT Mulhouse 
delegate explained, stoppages were synchronised so “all employees will make 
themselves heard so that certain unions won’t be tempted to agree with what 
management want”. When CGT participated in consultations, it sought to thwart 
working time changes. Mixed success ensued. CGT Rennes and Sochaux blocked 
NCS holiday reductions when CFDT and delegates from signatory unions joined in 
support, an outcome apparently influenced by the fact consultations fell on the eve of 
elections with delegates seeking to avoid unpopular decisions. CGT Trémery, 
supported by SUD, failed to prevent the change in the absence of additional support, 
conspicuously from CFDT. Notably, CFDT central delegates advised CFDT Rennes 
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and Sochaux to refrain from CGT collaboration in the build-up to 2014 elections. 
Falling in the months after the company agreement, these elections offer a reasonable 
proxy for measuring support for unions’ NCS stance. The combined results, 
individually mixed across plants, saw CGT lose its position as PSA’s leading 
representative union. 
 
Renault Company Level 
Renault’s response to the 2008 recession was 4,000 redundancies, temporary 
unemployment and pay moderation (0% in 2008-09, 0.7% in 2010). The Sandouville 
site risked closure, although the government maintained loans for Renault would only 
continue if the plant remained open. A tripartite-negotiated 2009 Contrat Social de 
Crise (CSC) at Renault provided for state supplemented ‘partial unemployment’ 
payments enabling employees to work fewer days, but retain 100% base pay rather 
than 50% under the state-only scheme. CFDT, CFE-CGC, CFTC and FO signed the 
agreement, whilst CGT refused, claiming payments were far from 100% of pay once 
annual leave and additional benefits were added. State support necessitated unions 
to offer quid pro quo however with government meetings with the unions pressing the 
need for labour reforms across plants. In this context, an alliance formed in 2010 
between CGT, CFDT, CFE-CGC, CFTC and FO to prepare the ground for 
competitiveness negotiations, even though formal talks did not commence until 2012. 
Company representativeness in this period is outlined below. 
Table 7 
 
Prior to such negotiations, the alliance sought to coordinate bargaining in annual 
Renault pay rounds. For CGT, these proved disappointing. Whereas other unions 
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sought 3.5% in 2011, CGT sought 10% allied to campaigns of one-hour work 
stoppages (1.7% was ultimately secured). Opting to end cooperation with the alliance 
as a result, CGT argued pay outcomes “will essentially depend on the amount of 
mobilisations among employees” rather than inter-union negotiating demands (CGT 
Renault  Communiqué). However, CGT returned to the alliance in 2012 under 
encouragement from CFDT with an agreed CGT-CFDT strategy of combining a 4.5% 
pay demand with three one-day strikes across all plants (a position which led FO to 
withdraw from the alliance). Yet again, a split emerged with the final offer of 3%: CFE-
CGC, CFTC and FO accepted, while CGT and CFDT sustained strike action and 
overtime bans in protest. Action continued across plants for one month post-
agreement, before CFDT withdrew, leaving CGT to call for stoppages which never 
occurred. Nonetheless, CGT developed better relations with CFDT in this period as 
competitiveness negotiations commenced in late 2012 and continued throughout early 
2013. CGT Renault praised a CFDT booklet Renault En Danger in a memo to plant 
sections, detailing a convergence of views on reforming job design and emphasising 
quality rather than cost-focused production in car plants. As competitiveness 
negotiations proceeded and Renault sought 8,500 job losses and forced redeployment 
in its final terms, CGT attempted to revive the alliance. CGT proposed: 
 
Given what is at stake, we think it necessary to organise a unified call to action. 
This would help our respective unions to organise collective action at local-level 
and allow for a larger level of mobilisation…with a view to making management 
take employees’ demands into account. We invite you to join us. 
CGT Renault Inter-Union Communiqué 
 
The call went unheeded until later negotiation rounds when Renault threatened plant 
closures at Douai and Flins to secure the talks’ conclusion. Denouncing Renault’s 
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threat, a CGT, CFDT, FO company strike was called with 1,700 workers participating 
across eight sites in January 2012. Two further strikes followed (Table 8). However, 
within weeks, CFE-CGC indicated its intention to sign and management concessions 
removing references to forced redeployment and a guarantee of sufficient production 
volumes led FO and CFDT to follow suit. 
 
Table 8 
 
The Contract for a New Dynamic of Renault Growth in France saw management 
pledge production of 710,000 vehicles by 2016 (520,000 vehicles were produced in 
2012) and avoid closures until 2016. In return, unions agreed to 7,500 job losses 
through attrition, redeployment and early retirement between 2013 and 2016 as well 
as working time increases from 32 hours to an average of 35 hours per week and a 
one-year pay pause with a provision that future increases benchmark to German and 
Spanish auto plants (subsequently 0.5%, 2014, 0.75% 2015). CGT, refusing to sign, 
argued: 
 
By saying “accept the lowest social bid and I will guarantee what I have already 
given you”, management are instigating that, every time models change, 
another agreement will be needed asking employees to accept further 
concessions. 
CGT Renault Delegate 
 
Renault Plant Level 
Transposing the Contract locally entailed further plant consultation on site specific 
matters. Representativeness in these plants is detailed below. 
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Table 9 
 
Reflecting company trends, an alliance involving CGT formed at Batilly, Cléon, Flins 
and Sandouville in 2010/2011. While Flins’ alliance dissolved as early as 2011 due to 
CE elections, remaining alliances did not survive the Contract. At Batilly, the Contract 
split unions into a pro-agreement faction of CFDT and CFE-CGC, and an anti-
agreement alliance of CGT, SUD and an unusually militant CFTC section. The 
Contract also ended the alliance at Cléon involving CGT, CFDT and FO, and at 
Sandouville, involving CGT and FO. No inter-union cooperation formed at Le Mans, 
with CGT acting independently. This site proved the most strike-prone during 
competitiveness talks, with CGT organising nine strikes in the plant over the four 
months of negotiations with small numbers participating (Table 10). CGT Douai was 
weakened by a split in 2009 and was unrepresentative in the period studied6. 
 
Table 10 
 
CGT at Batilly, Cleon, Flins and Sandouville deployed a combination of legal injunction 
and CE/Comité d'hygiène, de sécurité et des conditions de travail (CHSCT) 7 rights to 
obstruct consultations. Short CGT-led workplace stoppages also occurred despite 
opposition from other unions: 
 
CGT still think that a negotiation cannot be done without blockading factories 
or protesting on the street. It’s easier to never sign and to oppose everything 
because you can avoid taking responsibility. 
CFE-CGC Cléon Section Leader 
                                                            
6 Relating to divisions over adhering to CGT‐FTM positions.  
7 Health, safety and working conditions committees 
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When CGT says it wants to preserve jobs, it must accept this responsibility. It 
has found a comfortable place far away from meetings, occupying the media 
landscape outside of the factory. Unfortunately for them, decisions are not 
made in this way.  
CFDT Sandouville Section Leader 
 
The CGT, SUD, CFTC Batilly alliance combined stoppages with a legal case 
challenging the Contract’s “automatic application” provision to the plant, as the site is 
technically a Renault subsidiary, Renault SoVAB (Société de Véhicules Automobiles 
de Batilly). Although first rejected in Court, the alliance won on appeal, before a further 
Renault challenge overturned the ruling. In the interim, management announced that 
Batilly’s budget would be suspended and production of the site’s main model 
transferred to Barcelona if the case blocked Contract changes. Deploying CE rights in 
response, CGT, SUD, CFTC had the threatened transfer independently costed which 
concluded that savings would be inferior to continued Batilly production. The alliance 
dismissed the threat’s credibility. 
 
CGT unsuccessfully pursued legal challenges at Cléon, Le Mans and Sandouville. 
These challenges claimed the Contract derogated from a 1999 agreement on working 
time at the plants. Unless this agreement was repealed, CGT maintained that the 
Contract could not override its terms. Their challenge was opposed by other unions, 
claiming obstruction risked the volumes promised under the agreement. Despite the 
claims’ failure in court, CGT Cléon and Sandouville, utilising CHSCT rights, delayed 
the transposition of new working time arrangements by securing an independent 
assessment of shift impacts on employee safety. While the final report found no 
grounds to obstruct extension, the review delayed the introduction of revised shifts by 
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four months. This was regarded as a “small victory for employees” by CGT Cléon. 
Parallel efforts at Le Mans to use CHSCT rights were prevented by CFE-CGC and 
CFDT voting the CGT resolution down. CE elections following this period again 
provide a reasonable proxy for gauging employee support for CGT strategy vis-à-vis 
the Contract. In a wider context of very minor loss at company level, plants observed 
mixed support for CGT action (Table 9). 
 
5. Discussion  
Literature on French trade unionism under decentralised bargaining discerns two 
contrasting trajectories. The first proposes that workplace bargaining exposes weak 
unions to firms’ competitive pressures, inculcating subordinated compliance, while a 
second emphasises prospects for sustained militant opposition. While the prevalence 
of militant opposition among CGT sections in the case study complements the latter 
interpretation, some qualified elaboration is needed. While cultural traditions are 
relevant, the findings suggest institutional factors of bargaining structure, reformist 
union behaviour and electoral competition are equally important in explaining the 
militant opposition observed.  
 
As discussed earlier, those adhering to militant orientations are inclined to oppose 
and/or limit the granting of concessions. However, strategic choices of this sort require 
sufficient resources to be effective. When militants lack resources in sufficient amounts 
to prevent ‘give-backs’, the second-best option is to withhold legitimacy from the 
concessionary process. This is relatively costless to pursue because company 
bargaining structure and reformist union behaviour provide the necessary ‘opportunity 
structure’ (Meyer, 2004). Concessions employers seek are likely to be negotiated with 
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and ratified by reformist unions, rendering radical involvement superfluous, so long as 
the latter lack power to block agreements. Once reformists have sufficient 
representative powers to ratify agreements, militants can defect without pressure from 
employers, free from the constraints of unpalatable concessions. Thus, the causal 
links between coercive markets and ideological disorientation of unions noted 
elsewhere (Hyman, 2001; Murray et al. 2010) are not tightly coupled in the French 
case given bargaining structure and the multiplicity of reformist unions. These provide 
sufficient slack for radicals to retain militant opposition at workplace level. 
 
If bargaining structure and reformist willingness to sign agreements enable militant 
opposition, electoral competition may actively encourage it. Of course, the political 
science literature on deradicalisation emphasises that when militants run in elections, 
they convert into vote maximisers, ideologically shifting to the centre to expand appeal 
(Tezcűr, 2010). Given the 2008 reform tying bargaining capacity to workplace electoral 
representativeness, moderation of the militant tendency might have been expected to 
maximise voter appeal. Yet there is little evidence of this in the case study. Given that 
the moderate ground is already well occupied in the electoral contest, there is little 
advantage gained by militants moving into a crowded marketplace, potentially losing 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis other unions. Militants may calculate that dissatisfaction with 
reformist concessions will allow those standing outside agreements to grow 
electorally. Indeed, CGT electoral campaigning in the cases emphasised inter-union 
difference, portraying reformists as “house unions” complicit in negotiating “anti-social 
regressions”. The hope is that militant populism may trump reformist cooperation. 
Discontent might manifest as protest votes, boosting militants’ representativeness as 
observed at some individual plants. Indeed, reformists appear alive to this prospect, 
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regularly justifying their own position by comparing it to the alleged futility of CGT 
militancy.  The fact that militants retain the capacity to appeal to a (declining) 
constituency of hardcore support suggests representativeness is reasonably assured. 
Pressures to revise orientation and action may therefore be stymied in the short term. 
 
What are the implications of this choice pattern for radical relations with employers, 
other unions and employees? In the case studies, militant opposition appears limited 
in its capacity to impose costs on employers. Legalistic obstruction may only delay 
and risks being thwarted by reformists, while strike numbers frequently rely on modest 
participation rates. While it is conceivable that small numbers of small strikes cause 
sizeable disruption in lean auto plants (Silver, 2003), militant opposition has not 
impacted on the calibre of agreements being struck, and the few successes evident in 
transposition relied on reformists’ electoral opportunism. Interestingly, where 
militant opposition has notable effect is indirectly shaping reformist inter-union 
collaboration. As historically the most individually representative union in the 
industry, CGT has traditionally co-existed alongside a multiplicity of smaller 
reformist unions. The latter have overcome problems of size and fragmentation 
through collaboration, combining in sufficient numbers to support agreements. 
While this may simply be a ‘numbers game’ whereby reformists collaborate to 
reach requisite thresholds for signing agreements, there is an ideological 
convergence in favouring so-called ‘responsible alliances’ against the alleged 
recklessness of CGT militancy. This suggests a narrowing of the ‘permissive 
ideational space’ for militant action. Indeed, reformist inter-union behaviour more 
closely approximates the thesis of weakened unions succumbing to employer’s 
competitive pressures. A growing delegitimisation of militant opposition in the face 
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of job loss and plant closure is evident in majoritarian support amongst auto workers 
for reformist unions. Requiring 50% to ratify agreements, the 2016 El-Khomri 
reform may further consolidate inter-reformist collaboration, with the potential 
for further isolation of CGT. 
Although radicals might judge the electoral payoffs from militant opposition superior to 
that of moderation, vacating the space of compromise in a context of high job insecurity 
may limit appeal beyond a narrowing constituency. Certainly, this is the aggregate 
pattern of results in the case study and there is evidence of replication elsewhere. 
Recent restructuring at Air France, for example, highlights similar trends where 
a three-year business plan implemented in 2012 heralded several rounds of 
voluntary redundancies for cabin crew and ground staff. While reformist unions 
gave support to the plans resulting in 5,000 job losses, CGT initiated several 
rounds of strikes, notoriously culminating in internationally reported physical 
attacks on company directors. Yet support for CGT in this period evidenced 
decline, with the union falling from first to fourth in Air France’s electoral 
representativeness behind CFE-CGC, FO and UNSA. As noted previously, such 
electoral problems are reflected nationally with CFDT surpassing CGT as the 
country’s largest union in 2017. Such trends appear to recall Boxall’s (2008) 
argument that ineffectual choices lead to “strategic drift”. Militant opposition 
may fail to change employers’ positions when undermined by reformists, but 
may also miscalculate workers’ preferences when faced with restructuring and 
job insecurity. 
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In sum, the general conclusions to be inferred from this study is that coercive market 
forces at workplace level do not necessarily induce a shift from militant opposition 
among radical unions. The capacity for pursuing an independent agenda here is not 
attributable to internal power resources (Lévesque and Murray, 2005: 509), but 
externally derived from bargaining structure and the supply of reformist unionism to 
take up the slack. Competitive elections for workplace representativeness may 
reinforce militant opposition to ensure distinctiveness in a crowded electoral contest. 
Yet under conditions of restructuring and job insecurity, this risks strategic drift 
as militant opposition fails to alter employers’ positions, is circumvented by 
rival unions acting in alliance and holds declining appeal amongst large 
sections of the workforce demographic. Further research might examine cases 
where radicals hold the ‘balance of power’ and their support is necessary for 
agreement ratification. In this case, pressures from coercive market forces on militant 
unionism may be more tightly coupled for radicals’ capacity to vacate the 
concessionary space becomes difficult to accomplish. A break from the pattern of 
militant opposition might be expected. Research could also establish the 
consequences of such scenarios for inter-union relations and electoral support. 
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Table 1 Case Study 
  Plant type/numbers employed (as of 2017) Redundancies and headcount loss (2008‐2015)
(incl. early retirement, wastage, redeployment, 
redundancy) 
Plants threatened with investment and model 
loss/outsourcing/closure* 
PSA 11 manufacturing/5 R&D sites (France)
State share ownership taken in 2015: 13% 
19,500 headcount reductions announced
 
Mulhouse Assembly
7,500 employees 
2,000 redundancies Threatened with closure and transfer of track line 
to Slovakia (2012) 
Poissy Assembly
5,800 employees 
1500 redundancies
 
Offer to increase future models to site if costs 
compare favourably with Eastern European sites 
(2015) 
Rennes Assembly
4,000 employees 
2000 redundancies Threat of model loss to either China, India or 
Russia if ‘variable night shift’ not introduced 
(2011) 
 
Threatened with closure (2012) 
Sevelnord Assembly
2,400 employees 
350 redundancies Threatened with model loss to Spain, potential 
closure (2012) 
Sochaux Assembly
9,600 employees 
2000 redundancies Threatening outsourcing of component 
manufacture 
Trémery Powertrain manufacture
5,000 employees 
800 redundancies
 
Renault 10 manufacturing/2 R&D sites (France)
State owned shares: 19% (increased from 15% in 2015) 
12,500 headcount reductions announced 
Batilly Assembly
2,300 employees 
400 redundancies Threatened with re‐allocation of two models to 
Spain and Russia (2013) 
Clēon Powertrain manufacture
3,550 employees 
600 redundancies Product and process engineering roles 
threatened with outsourcing (2013) 
Douai Assembly
3,800 employees 
600 redundancies Threatened with closure (2013)
Flins Assembly
2,190 employees 
400 redundancies Threatened with closure  and transfer of 
production to Turkey (2013) 
Le Mans Powertrain manufacture
2,380 employees 
740 redundancies Site compared with sites in Villeurbane and Spain 
for securing investment (2012) 
Sandouville Assembly
1,770 employees 
1000 redundancies Threatened with closure (2008)
Review of maintenance department to identify 
non‐core for outsourcing (2013) 
*Source: Union documentation 
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Table 2 Evidence and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8  GSEA: Groupement  des  syndicats  européens  de  l'automobile  (Association  of  European  Automobile  Unions)  is  a  small  association  of  trade  unions  established  almost 
exclusively in PSA. Historically, GSEA originates from the ‘yellow union movement’ (syndicalisme jaune), notably Confédération des syndicats libres (CSL) and Confédération 
française du travail (CFT). GSEA is representative within PSA, but its influence in other companies is marginal. It is also active in PSA Vigo, Spain. 
Source Type Analysis 
Documents 1200 CGT memoranda 
PSA/Renault CE minutes  
 
700 CFDT, CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO 
PSA/Renault memoranda  
Evidence coded into categories of ‘orientation’ 
(patterns of militancy/moderation) and ‘action’ 
(patterns of conflict/cooperation)  
 
Evidence to measure support for CGT using CE 
results and numbers participating in CGT 
strikes (where available)  
Interviews Semi-structured interviews: 16 CGT 
PSA/Renault section leaders from Table 1 
sites 
 
Semi-structured interviews: 31 CFDT, CFE-
CGC, CFTC, FO,  Le Groupement des 
Syndicats Européens de l'Automobile 
(GSEA8) PSA/Renault section leaders from 
Table 1 sites 
Observation CGT strikes at PSA/Renault sites 
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Table 3 PSA Representativeness (%) 
 
 CGT CFDT CFE-CGC CFTC FO GSEA 
2011 22 14 18 12 18 14 
2015 20 15 20 12 20 12 
                                                                                                                                                                         Source: Electoral reports 
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Table 4 Company-Wide Strikes Protesting PSA NCS Proposals 
 
 
Source:  Union documentation
 Frequency Total Workers 
 Involved 
CGT Action 3 4200 
CGT Joint Action 3 4000 
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Table 5 PSA Plant-Level Representativeness (%) 
  CGT CFDT CFE-CGC CFTC FO GSEA SUD UNSA Formal Inter-Union 
Alliance 
Mulhouse           
2007*  25 19 Alliance 
CFE-CGC/CFTC/FO 
   54 
2011  25 20  1 3 51 
2015  22 20   4 54 
Poissy           
2009  27 4 11 13 41  4   
2013  27 1 8 14 44  6   
Rennes            
2006*  21 8 8  11 46    
2010  35 8 7 4 15 32    
2014  23 25 Alliance 
CFE-CGC/CFTC/FO/GSEA 
  53 
 
Sevelnord           
2005*  25 8 5  16 28    
2009  27 7 7 8 20 27  5  
2013  26 10 6 4 25 28  1  
Sochaux           
2007*  30 10 Alliance 
CFE-CGC/CFTC/FO/GSEA 
  60 
2011  35 12   53 
2015  31 14   55 
Trémery           
2010  15 20 3 13 3 35 11   
2014  21 10 4 13 2 40 10   
*Pre-representative reform election where available. Average turnout: 85%. Source: Election Reports. 
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Table 6 Plant Strikes Protesting PSA NCS Proposals and Plant Transposition* 
 Company  Negotiations Plant Transposition 
 Frequency Total Workers 
 Involved 
 Frequency Workers 
 Involved 
Mulhouse     
CGT Action    1 30 
CGT Joint Action 2 1100   
Poissy     
CGT Action 1 350 1 15 
CGT Joint Action     
Rennes      
CGT Action 2  10 180 
CGT Joint Action 4 3250 1 800 
Sochaux     
CGT Action   2 330 
CGT Joint Action 2 1400   
Trémery     
CGT Action     
CGT Joint Action 1  1  
*Excludes participation in company-wide strikes. Shaded areas indicate unknown numbers. Source: Union documentation 
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Table 7 Renault Representativeness (%) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Source: Election Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CGT CFDT CFE-CGC CFTC FO SUD 
2011 25 19 30 5 16 6 
2015 24 21 32 2 13 7 
41 
 
 
 
Table 8 Company-wide strikes protesting Renault Contract proposals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Union documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Total Workers 
 Involved 
CGT Action 1 700 
CGT Joint Action 3 3000 
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Table 9 Renault Plant Level Representativeness (%) 
  CGT  CFDT CFE‐CGC CFTC FO SUD UNSA Formal Inter‐
Union Alliance 
Batilly     
2007*  37  9 12 13 17 12
2011  32  11 10 16 13 17
2014  30  16 15 24 9  15
Cléon     
2005*  44  17 23 5 10
2009  49  15 24 12
2013  52  15 24   9
Douai     
2006*  28  22 8 5 37
2010  9 (CGT‐Douai)/6 
(Confederal 
CGT)** 
18 11 6 29 21
2014  12  19 17 1 30 21
Flins     
2007*  23  10 12 3 52
2011  31  15 14 2 38
2015  26  30 14 21 10
Le Mans     
2006*  32  33 29 6 
2010  38  22 33 7 
2014  40  24 36  
Sandouville     
2006*  46  3 Alliance
CFE‐CGC/FO 
Alliance
CFE‐CGC/FO 
50
2010  50  x 12 38
2014  35  7 Alliance
CFE‐CGC/FO 
Alliance
CFE‐CGC/FO 
58
*Pre-representative reform results where available. Average turnout: 80%. **CGT-Douai section split into rival groups both claiming rights to CGT title. Source: Election Reports.
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Table 10 Plant Strikes Protesting Renault Contract Proposals and Plant Transposition* 
 Company Negotiations Plant Transposition 
 Frequency Total Workers 
Involved 
Frequency Workers 
Involved 
Batilly     
CGT Joint Action 1 103 5  
Cléon     
CGT Action   1 80 
CGT Joint Action 3 405   
Douai     
CGT Action     
CGT Joint Action 1 26 2  
Flins     
CGT Joint Action 2 385   
Le Mans     
CGT Action 9 190   
CGT Joint Action 1    
Sandouville     
CGT Action                               1 100 
CGT Joint Action 2 275   
*Excludes participation in company-wide strike. Shaded areas indicate unknown numbers. Source: Union documentation. 
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